# 1AC

Normal

# 2AC

### 2ac prolif slow

#### Slow proliferation still causes our impacts – prevents crisis stability

Tellis 02 (Ashley Tellis, senior advisor to the U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi, “The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear India,” Orbis, Volume 46, Issue 1)

While this posture augurs well for crisis stability where sudden emergencies are concerned, it becomes less relevant when long intervals of strategic warning are available or when a crisis evolves slowly. Under these circumstances, the nuclear capabilities in all the relevant states would progressively increase in readiness depending on the rate at which strategic components are alerted, integrated (if necessary), and mobilized in accordance with preplanned contingency procedures. Once such activities are under way, the relatively low peacetime readiness of the various strategic forces would no longer provide crisis stability, because operational dormancy disappears irrevocably once the process of strategic alerting is completed.

### 2ac t no migration

#### Economic engagement is determined by means, not ends – agreeing to ease financial restrictions is distinct from travel promotion

Resnick 1 (Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco | Danco)

Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas.¶ Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits.¶ A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT¶ In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:¶ DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS¶ Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations¶ Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes¶ Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa¶ MILITARY CONTACTS¶ Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa¶ Arms transfers¶ Military aid and cooperation¶ Military exchange and training programs¶ Confidence and security-building measures¶ Intelligence sharing¶ ECONOMIC CONTACTS¶ Trade agreements and promotion¶ Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants¶ CULTURAL CONTACTS¶ Cultural treaties¶ Inauguration of travel and tourism links¶ Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25)¶ Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.26 For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.27 Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.¶ This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.28¶ Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.¶ This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Economic engagement includes offers to remove financial restrictions – distinct from travel promotion

Haass and O’Sullivan 2K (Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State and close advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell, received the State Department's Distinguished Service Award, and Meghan O’Sullivan, former deputy national security adviser on Iraq and Afghanistan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs, adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and senior fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy,” Brookings Institution, 2000, pp. 5-6, Google Book)

As is evident from the fairly small existing literature on the use of incentives in foreign policy, many different engagement strategies exist, depending¶ on such variables as the actors engaged, the incentives employed, and the objectives pursued. The first important distinction to be made in any typology¶ of engagement is whether the strategy is conditional or unconditional. A strategy of unconditional engagement would offer certain changes in U.S. policy¶ toward the country without the explicit agreement that a reciprocal act would¶ follow. Depending on the intention behind these unconditional initiatives—¶ and, of course, the reaction of the target country—this form of engagement¶ may be short-lived. Charles Osgood, in his GRIT (graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction) theory offers a model of cooperation¶ that stems from an uninvited, opening initiative by one country.8¶ Although¶ the act in itself is unconditional, the failure of the target country to reciprocate with meaningful gestures soon leads to the abandonment of the strategy; alternatively, if the initial accommodating steps are met with positive¶ moves, cooperation ensues. President George Bush’s 1991 nuclear reduction initiative, which was reciprocated by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev,¶ is one instance of a GRIT approach spurring cooperation. Conciliatory gestures made by the United States to Iran in March 2000 may be another.¶ Another form of unconditional engagement takes a broader perspective,¶ by regarding inducements offered to civil society and the private sector over¶ time as playing an important role in creating openings for cooperation further down the road. In these unconditional strategies, certain initiatives or¶ changes in U.S. policy toward the country are made without necessarily expecting, or even soliciting, reciprocal acts from the regime. This form of¶ engagement may be implemented by nongovernmental actors, such as the¶ programs sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy that promote democracy and the development of institutions in many authoritarian regimes. Alternatively, this engagement may entail explicit modifications¶ to U.S. policy, as occurred with Cuba in March 1998 and January 1999. By¶ allowing licensed sales of food and agricultural inputs to independent entities in Cuba, by easing travel and financial restrictions, and by promoting¶ communication between America and the island, the United States sought¶ to buttress the development of civil society and the private sector in Cuba.9¶ In doing so, the United States hoped to build momentum leading to greater¶ political changes, which would facilitate U.S.-Cuban cooperation in the future, perhaps many years down the road.¶ In contrast, the expectations surrounding conditional engagement strategies are more contractual; in its most narrow form of the tit-for-tat process¶ explored by Robert Axelrod, cooperation is based on a strict cycle of reciprocity.10 However, conditional engagement can also refer to a much less¶ tightly orchestrated series of exchanges in which the United States extends¶ inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. These desired¶ alterations in the behavior of the target country may be particular, welldefined policy stances, or as in the case of Alexander George’s conditional¶ reciprocity, they may refer to more vague changes in attitudes and the overall orientation of regimes.11 While recognizing the subtle differences among¶ the various concepts of conditional engagement, this book uses the term¶ largely to refer to strategies of reciprocity with focused, policy objectives in¶ mind. The Agreed Framework struck between the United States and North¶ Korea in 1994 is one such example. In a specific effort to curtail nuclear¶ proliferation, America linked the provision of economic incentives to the¶ fulfillment of North Korean commitments to halt Pyongyang’s development¶ of nuclear weapons.¶ Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from¶ which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such¶ as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology,¶ loans, and economic aid.12 Other equally useful economic incentives involve¶ the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans,¶ or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United¶ States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global¶ economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most¶ potent incentives in today’s global market.13¶ Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of¶ summits between leaders—or the termination of these benefits. Military¶ engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and¶ human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers.14¶ These areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building¶ people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange¶ of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement.

### 2ac ptx

#### **Kerry is key, not Obama**

Ackerman 11-12 (Spencer,- national security editor for Guardian US. A former senior writer for Wired, he won the 2012 National Magazine Award for Digital Reporting “Kerry to pressure Congress against passing new wave of Iran sanctions”)

All eyes are on John Kerry and his attempt to persuade a markedly skeptical Congress to forestall a new wave of sanctions on Iran, as the international community hopes to close out a nuclear deal in eight days' time. The secretary of state, who on Tuesday was returning to Washington empty-handed after talks in Geneva over Iran’s nuclear program failed to yield an interim deal, will meet this week with lawmakers who believe enacting additional economic sanctions will give the US increased leverage when negotiations resume on 20 November. The Senate banking committee, which Kerry is slated to brief in private on Wednesday, is considering a new sanctions push that has bipartisan support. The panel has agreed to delay pushing its sanctions bill out to the full Senate – after already delaying it for the Geneva talks – until Kerry makes his case, giving the former Massachusetts senator a limited window in which to forestall the new sanctions. Vice-president Joe Biden, the administration’s closer on many aspects of legislative dealmaking, is expected to engage with lawmakers as well. Additionally, senator Bob Corker, the ranking Republican on the Senate foreign relations committee, has for now stopped short of endorsing a new wave of sanctions. The pressure is on Kerry, Corker implied, to convince a skeptical Senate that additional sanctions ought to be avoided.

#### Filibuster reform thumps

Berger 11-22 (Judson Berger, “Filibuster Fallout: Reid maneuver could send ‘wrecking ball’ through talks on key legislation,” Fox News, 11-22-2013, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/11/22/filibuster-fallout-reid-maneuver-could-send-wrecking-ball-through-talks-on-key/)

Democrats who claimed victory -- including President Obama -- in stripping the Senate minority of its power to block nominations may have done so at the sacrifice of the president's legislative agenda. ¶ Before Thursday, trust on Capitol Hill was frayed yet there was tentative hope following the bruising fight over the partial shutdown that Republicans and Democrats could find some spectrum of common ground for the rest of Obama's term. Maybe pass a few budgets, maybe do something lasting about that pesky deficit. ¶ But the move to use a rare parliamentary tactic and overhaul Senate procedure making it easier for the majority party to approve presidential nominees has poisoned an already tainted well. Any prospect for compromise on items ranging from immigration legislation to a fiscal deal to tax reform is now that much fainter. ¶ "There's no question that the move by Harry Reid will make it much tougher to get anything done between now and 2014," GOP strategist and former long-time Senate aide John Ullyot told FoxNews.com. ¶ "In the short-term, it's a wrecking ball through any efforts that were underway previously to have both parties work together on key bills." ¶ Because of the rule change, non-Supreme Court judicial nominees and executive-office nominees can now be approved with just 51 votes, as opposed to 60. ¶ In the first test of Senate relations following the filibuster change, Republicans united to block a critical defense policy bill. The bill failed in a vote late Thursday, nine votes short of the number needed to advance. ¶ Republicans were angry over Democrats' move to limit amendments, but the vote could also reflect new tensions over Reid deploying what's known as the "nuclear option." ¶ The Senate is now adjourning for the Thanksgiving break, and lawmakers will have time to stew over what just happened. ¶ The docket, though, is not getting any thinner. Under the terms of the budget resolution in late October, a bipartisan committee is supposed to be hammering out a new deal to keep the government operating into early 2014. The committee is charged with coming up with a plan by Dec. 13, and Congress is facing a January deadline to approve it. Plus they're facing a Feb. 7 deadline to raise the debt ceiling. ¶ Several lawmakers had already indicated there will be no "grand bargain" this time around, but now the question is whether lawmakers can avoid another partial shutdown.

#### Congress will hold off and veto solves – ideology means PC isn’t key anyway

Kaplan 11-24-13 (Fred, “We Have a Deal With Iran. A Good One,” <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2013/11/_iran_nukes_this_is_exactly_the_deal_that_obama_hoped_to_achieve_in_geneva.html?wpisrc=burger_bar>

The [Iranian nuclear deal](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/23/fact-sheet-first-step-understandings-regarding-islamic-republic-iran-s-n) struck Saturday night is a triumph. It contains nothing that any American, Israeli, or Arab skeptic could reasonably protest. Had George W. Bush negotiated this deal, Republicans would be hailing his diplomatic prowess, and rightly so. A few weeks ago, a “senior administration official” outlined the agreement that President Obama hoped to achieve in Geneva. Some reporters who heard the briefing (including me) thought that the terms were way too one-sided, that the Iranians would never accept them. Here’s the thing: The deal just signed by Iran and the [P5+1 nations](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P5%2B1) (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China plus Germany) is precisely the hoped-for deal laid out at that briefing. It is an interim agreement, not a treaty (which means, among other things, that it doesn’t require Senate ratification). It is meant as a first step toward a comprehensive treaty to be negotiated in the next six months. More than that, it expires in six months. In other words, if Iran and the other powers can’t agree on a follow-on accord in six months, nobody is stuck with a deal that was never meant to be permanent. There is no opportunity for traps and trickery. Meanwhile, Iran has to do the following things: halt the enrichment of all uranium above 5 percent and freeze the stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.5 percent; neutralize its stockpile of uranium that’s been enriched to 20 percent (either by diluting it to 5 percent purity or converting it to a form that cannot be used to make a weapon); stop producing, installing, or modernizing centrifuges; stop constructing more enrichment facilities; halt all activities at the Arak nuclear reactor (which has the potential to produce nuclear weapons made of plutonium); permit much wider and more intrusive measures of verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency, including daily inspections of all facilities. Without going into a lot of technical detail (which can be read [here](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/23/fact-sheet-first-step-understandings-regarding-islamic-republic-iran-s-n)), the point is this: The agreement makes it impossible for the Iranians to make any further progress toward making a nuclear weapon in the next six months—and, if the talks break down after that, and the Iranians decide at that point to start building a nuclear arsenal, it will take them much longer to do so. In exchange for these restraints, the P5+1 nations agree to free up about $6 billion of Iran’s long-frozen foreign assets. This amounts to a very small percentage of the[sanctions imposed on Iran’s energy and financial sectors](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanctions_against_Iran#UN_sanctions_against_Iran). Meanwhile, all other sanctions will remain in place and continue to be vigorously enforced; the agreement doesn’t affect those sanctions at all. The U.S. Congress does have to agree not to impose additional sanctions in the next six months. If it imposes them anyway, they must know that this agreement—and the international coalition holding the sanctions in place—will collapse. Even this Congress is likely to hold off. If it does go ahead and passes a bill imposing new sanctions, Obama will certainly veto it. So what’s not to like? According to [Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/20/us-iran-nuclear-israel-russia-idUSBRE9AJ0JC20131120) and several American neoconservatives, plenty. In their view, a good agreement must, first, dismantle Iran’s entire nuclear program and, second, ban Iran from enriching uranium to any level. In other words, it must ensure that Iran can never build a nuclear weapon. Notice, I wrote in my lede that the agreement signed Saturday night contains nothing that anyone could “reasonably” protest. These objections are unreasonable. Even if the mullahs of Iran vanished tomorrow and were replaced by secular democrats, these new rulers would continue to demand what they see as the right to enrich uranium to some degree. Some would argue that the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html) enshrines this right. Certainly the NPT allows them the right to develop “peaceful nuclear energy”—that is, to have some form of a nuclear program. Netanyahu’s worry has been that a partial accord would allow the Iranians to advance their nuclear program while stringing us along in interminable follow-on negotiations. It should be clear that the terms of this agreement prevent them from playing games. President Obama also said, in a [televised address](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/23/statement-president-first-step-agreement-irans-nuclear-program) Saturday night, that if the Iranians don’t abide by their commitments in the next six months, he will again freeze their overseas funds and impose stiffer sanctions. Does the agreement end all reasonable worries about Iran? No. The next phase—the more comprehensive agreement that the parties will try to negotiate over the next six months—will be a much harder nut. The follow-on accord will, presumably, require Iran to dismantle more of its nuclear program—and require the West to start lifting its more crippling sanctions. This will be much more controversial, on all sides. If the first-phase deal falls apart, it will be easy for President Obama to refreeze Iran’s foreign assets. But if the next phase—the comprehensive accord—falls apart, it will be harder for the P5+1 nations to reimpose sanctions. On the Iranian side, their hard-liners must be gulping at even this interim agreement, hoping that the unfreezing of assets will provide enough economic relief to make the nuclear cutbacks worthwhile. How much further they’re willing to cut without the total lifting of Western sanctions—and how far the West is willing to lift sanctions without the total dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programs—is unknown. Merely posing the question this way is cause for pessimism. Then again, who would have thought, even a few weeks ago, that an agreement of this magnitude could possibly have been negotiated? [Until two months](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2013/09/iran_agrees_to_nuclear_program_negotiations_will_ayatollah_ali_khamenei.html) ago, the United States and Iran had not held formal talks of any sort since 1979. Yet this deal goes way beyond any arms-control accord that the United States and the Soviet Union struck in the first quarter-century of détente. But let’s get serious and address the real reason some people object to this agreement—or any Iranian agreement. First, they don’t trust Iran. This is reasonable; when it comes to their nuclear facilities, the Iranians have been lying and cheating for years. The thing about this agreement is that—like all well-written accords between countries with good reason to distrust one another—it doesn’t require trust. The second reason for resistance, and a more serious political problem, is that some people (including the Israeli president, many American neoconservatives, and lots of Sunni Arabs) are worried, above all, that this agreement might work. They don’t want to see the United States and the other big powers cozying up with Iran. The Sunnis fear that doing so might tilt the regional balance of power against them and toward the Shiites. Some Israelis fear that a deal could signal an American retreat from the entire region (though many Israelis, including former Mossad chiefs, support an Iranian deal, within reason). And some American neoconservatives … well, let’s face it, they trust Netanyahu more than they trust Obama. It’s time for all the critics to take a deep breath, read the terms of the agreement, recognize that the deal goes way beyond what anybody could reasonably have hoped for, and give this thing a chance. It is in U.S., Israeli, and Arab interests for Iran to do things that make it harder to build a nuclear bomb. And if a détente-of-sorts evolves from these talks, if it becomes possible for the United States and Iran todiscuss, then maybe act upon, issues of mutual interest, then that is certainly in our interest, whatever anybody else thinks. In recent weeks, some neocons have warned that Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s seemingly pragmatic new president who’s brought about all these breakthroughs, is “[no Gorbachev](https://www.google.com/search?q=Rouhani+%22no+Gorbachev%22&oq=Rouhani+%22no+Gorbachev%22&aqs=chrome..69i57.4124j0j8&sourceid=chrome&espv=210&es_sm=91&ie=UTF-8).” This is true, but it’s worth recalling that, back when he first came to power and started talking about glasnost and perestroika, these same people warned that Gorbachev was no Gorbachev either. The agreement struck Saturday night (or Sunday morning, Geneva time) is a first step. In a year’s time, it may be seen as a small step and a brief, naive step at that. But for now it’s a step rife with historic possibilities; it’s a step that should be taken with caution but also with hope and gusto.

#### No congressional action means ZERO PC required – AND, secrecy shields blame

Pascual, et al 9 (Carlos Pascual, State Department Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, former Ambassador to Mexico, former Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, M.P.P Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, B.A. Stanford University; and Vicki Huddleston, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, former Ambassador to Mali, former Principal Officer of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana (equivalent of Ambassador to a state with no official diplomatic relations), former Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution; Co-Directors, Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition, “CUBA: A New Policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement,” Report of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition, April 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413\_cuba.pdf)

Given the strong sentiments and expectations¶ that Cuba engenders, it would be preferable for¶ the Executive Branch to proceed discreetly. The¶ president might first announce the principles he¶ hopes to achieve in Cuba through a policy of en¶ -¶ gagement that promotes human rights, the well-¶ being of the Cuban people, and the growth of¶ civil society. To carry out the president’s vision,¶ the Secretary of the Treasury will then have the¶ responsibility to write and publish the changes¶ to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations by li¶ -¶ censing activities designed to achieve these ends.¶ The Secretary of State can quietly accomplish¶ many diplomatic initiatives on a reciprocal basis¶ without any need to publicize them. This quiet¶ diplomacy might be complemented by a refusal¶ to engage in what some refer to as megaphone¶ diplomacy, in which our governments trade in¶ -¶ sults across the Straits of Florida, and which only¶ contributes to making the United States appear¶ to be a bully.¶ The president’s leadership in carrying out a new¶ Cuba policy is essential because by law and prac¶ -¶ tice it is his responsibility to determine the over¶ -¶ all conduct of U.S. foreign policy.¶ In the case of¶ Cuba, he has ample executive authority to put¶ in place a policy of engagement. If he wishes,¶ he can expand bilateral diplomatic relations, re¶ -¶ move Cuba from the list of terrorist countries,¶ and rescind the current policy that grants im¶ -¶ mediate legal residency to Cubans who enter the¶ United States without visas. Should bilateral re¶ -¶ lations improve, he could choose to negotiate the¶ unresolved expropriated property claims of U.S.¶ citizens and review the status of Guantanamo¶ Bay Naval Base. ¶ Despite the myth that Congress must legislate¶ to change U.S. policy toward Cuba, history has¶ shown that presidents routinely take actions to¶ strengthen or loosen the embargo as they see fit.¶ Thus, like his predecessors,¶ p¶ resident Obama can¶ change regulations in order to modify the Cuban¶ embargo without the need for an act of Congress.¶ He will, however, ultimately require Congress to¶ legislate in order to remove the embargo and lift¶ all restrictions on travel.

#### No link – *empirics* and *vote counts* prove plan has sufficient support

Moura 9 (Fabiola Moura, Bloomberg, “Overturning Cuba Travel Ban May Pass House This Year, Farr Says,” 9-21-2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email\_en&sid=a5R62TiRNi00)

Legislation to end a ban on Americans traveling to Cuba has enough support in the U.S. House of Representatives to win approval by year-end, said Representative Sam Farr, a California Democrat. ¶ The bill to let U.S. citizens resume travel to the Caribbean island except in times of war or cases in which they face imminent danger has 181 votes in the House and needs 218 to pass, said Farr, a co-sponsor of the legislation. The plan is backed by travel groups such as the United States Tour Operators Association and the National Tour Association and human rights groups such as the Washington Office on Latin America and has been helped by President Barack Obama’s election, he said. ¶ “It is believed we can get to this before the end of the year,” Farr, 68, said in an interview in New York. “We haven’t had a policy about Cuba. We’ve had policies about getting votes in Florida and Obama changed that by getting those votes.” ¶ The U.S. ended restrictions on Sept. 3 on Cuban-Americans travel and money transfers to relatives in Cuba. The new rules also allow U.S. telecommunications companies to provide service in Cuba for mobile telephone, satellite radio and television. Exceptions to the 1962 trade embargo on communist Cuba include $500 million per year in agricultural exports, Farr said. ¶ “If you are a potato, you can get to Cuba very easily,” he said. “But if you are a person, you can’t, and that is our problem.” ¶ Pressure ¶ Obama is under pressure from Latin American leaders to end the trade embargo to help improve relations in the region. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will ask Obama to end the embargo during the United Nations General Assembly this week, spokesman Marcelo Baumbach said Sept. 17. ¶ Obama announced in April he would lift travel limits for Cuban-Americans visiting family in Cuba. At the same time, Representatives Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Mario Diaz-Balart, both Florida Republicans, issued a statement that the president had made “unilateral concessions to the dictatorship” that would “embolden it to further isolate, imprison and brutalize pro-democracy activists.” ¶ Cuba’s former President Fidel Castro, who handed power to his brother Raul Castro last year, called on Obama to completely lift the trade embargo. ¶ White House officials have said there are no plans to lift the embargo. At the same time, the administration is undertaking a full review of policy toward Cuba with the goal of advancing “the cause of freedom” in the country less than 100 miles (160 kilometers) from the coast of Florida, Daniel Restrepo, a special assistant to Obama, said in April. ¶ March Proposal ¶ A group of House and Senate lawmakers proposed in March ending restrictions to allow all U.S. citizens and residents to travel to Cuba. Farr said the legislation, known as the “Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act,” also has enough votes to clear the Senate, where Senator Byron Dorgan, a North Dakota Democrat, and Republican Senator Michael Enzi of Wyoming introduced the legislation. ¶ “There’s a lot more openness in the Congress,” Geoff Thale, program director in the Washington Office on Latin America, said in an interview in New York. “Support is building. The travel industry and business community are not just formally in support but actively engaged. That’s why I think we’re going to see a difference.” ¶ Senator Robert Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat who is of Cuban descent and sits on the Foreign Relations Committee, has vowed to fight the easing of travel restrictions. ¶ Philip Peters, a vice president and Cuba expert at the Lexington Institute, a public policy research group in Arlington, Virginia, said proponents of the bill may succeed in winning congressional approval as public opinion grows among Americans that U.S. rules on Cuba aren’t in line with much of the country’s foreign policy. ¶ ‘Good Shot’ ¶ “They’ve got a good shot,” Peters said in an interview. “Certainly right now they’re in striking distance and they’ve got plenty of time left in the session.” ¶ Ending the travel ban may lead as many as 1 million Americans to visit the island every year, Lisa Simon, president of the National Tour Association, known as NTA, said in an interview. It would also help push forward talks on human rights issues, Thale said. ¶ “We’ve had a policy for 50 years of isolating Cuba and it hasn’t done anything about the human rights situation,” Thale said. “I don’t think there is some magic solution. I don’t think ending the travel ban will cause Fidel to say let’s have elections, let’s release all the political prisoners tomorrow. What it will do is open the process of dialogue.” ¶ Obama’s administration has been showing a “gradual relaxation and diplomatic opening” toward Cuba, Thale said. He cited the government’s decision to reinitiate talks on migration and direct mail, and also to put down the billboard operated by the U.S. government outside its special interests section in Havana, which he said often displayed anti-Cuba messages.

#### Winners win – fractures the Republican Party

Dickerson 1/18 (John, Slate, Go for the Throat!, www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/politics/2013/01/barack\_obama\_s\_second\_inaugural\_address\_the\_president\_should\_declare\_war.single.html)

On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. Gridlock over the fiscal cliff preceded it and gridlock over the debt limit, sequester, and budget will follow. After the election, the same people are in power in all the branches of government and they don't get along. There's no indication that the president's clashes with House Republicans will end soon. Inaugural speeches are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the day. But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That bipartisan bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works is doing “serious harm” to the country. The challenge for President Obama’s speech is the challenge of his second term: how to be great when the environment stinks. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires something more than simply the clever application of predictable stratagems. Washington’s partisan rancor, the size of the problems facing government, and the limited amount of time before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: The president who came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation can only cement his legacy if he destroys the GOP. If he wants to transform American politics, he must go for the throat. President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker. How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack Obama of the first administration might have approached the task by finding some Republicans to deal with and then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would win some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too. That's the old way. He has abandoned that. He doesn't think it will work and he doesn't have the time. As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the Republicans are dead set on opposing him. They cannot be unchained by schmoozing. Even if Obama were wrong about Republican intransigence, other constraints will limit the chance for cooperation. Republican lawmakers worried about primary challenges in 2014 are not going to be willing partners. He probably has at most 18 months before people start dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. Through a series of clarifying fights over controversial issues, he can force Republicans to either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or cause a rift in the party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray.

### 2ac prolif adv cp – IAEA

#### Restrictions and exemptions are key

McAuliff 11 (John McAuliff, Director of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development, “New OFAC Guidelines Shape Cuba Travel, 4-25-11, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-mcauliff/new-guidelines-shape-cuba_b_853387.html> | Danco)

Finally on April 19th the Office of Foreign Assets Controls [OFAC] released 51 pages of guidelines implementing President Obama's new regulations on purposeful travel announced three months earlier. (Links to full text here and analysis here.)¶ The guidelines are a semi-breakthrough, welcome for what they do, infuriating for what they don't, and frustrating because big questions still remain on what they actually mean in practice.¶ In theory, most Americans should now have an option for legal albeit encumbered travel to Cuba.¶ The guidelines confirm the Obama Administration's significant step forward of granting general licenses for higher education students and all religious organizations -- with which 84% of Americans are affiliated. These provisions offer two broad opportunities to initiate serious engagement between the two countries without obstacles from Washington.¶ The language for specific licenses raises all the predicted problems of cumbersome bureaucracy wasting time on fine tuning the rights of Americans for political purposes and diverting resources from more necessary tasks.¶ Most attention has focused on what will flow from the comprehensive but undefined people-to-people umbrella:¶ OFAC may issue a specific license to an organization that sponsors and organizes programs to promote people-to-people contact authorizing the organization and individuals traveling under its auspices to engage in educational exchanges not involving academic study pursuant to a degree program. In general, licenses issued pursuant to this policy will be valid for one year and will contain no limitation on the number of trips that can be taken. (p 22)¶ Will we soon see the return of a wide range of informational programs allowed before President Bush's crackdown of 2004?¶ ...third party student exchanges, high schools, educators of the retired, college alumni, world affairs councils, museums, chambers of commerce, Rotary Clubs, farm organizations, sports teams, community groups, professional associations, foundations, NGOs, doctors, environmentalists, artists, architects, etc.¶ While general licenses avoid the contradiction between trust building exchanges and system change politics, specific licenses could by granted based on which goal is foremost. The core problem is illustrated by this revealing paragraph:¶ Meeting all of the relevant specific licensing criteria in a given section does not guarantee that a specific license will be issued, as foreign policy considerations and additional factors may be considered by OFAC in making its licensing determinations....specific licenses are not granted as a matter of right. (p 4)¶ As we saw with the denial of a license for Irish American traditional musicians to participate in last week's Celtic Festival in Havana, even the performances criteria can be arbitrary and unfathomable.¶ The test is how promptly and how flexibly OFAC handles applications that have been piling up since January from groups that were licensed during the Clinton administration.¶ The guidelines text itself embodies contradictions that arise from a narrow politicized interpretation of purposeful travel. They are most flagrant in Humanitarian Projects. Some kinds of charity are OK; some are not; collegiality and sharing of skills are outlawed.

#### Additional resources will be allocated to Cuba travel enforcement – empirically proven

Chang 2 (Nancy Chang, Center for Constitutional Rights, “Restrictions on Travel to Cuba,” statement before the Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 2-11-2002, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg78446/html/CHRG-107shrg78446.htm)

Enforcement of the restrictions on travel to Cuba are being ¶ stepped up at a time when government resources are urgently ¶ needed to fight terrorism. In July 2001, in response to ¶ widespread complaints of a Bush administration crackdown on ¶ Americans traveling to Cuba, a spokesperson for the Department ¶ of Treasury finally acknowledged that a higher incidence of ¶ penalty cases is being issued. The Department of Treasury ¶ reported that while OFAC had issued only 188 enforcement ¶ letters in all of 2000, it had issued 766 such letters in 2001.¶ The Center was recently informed by OFAC officials that ¶ administrative law judges will soon be conducting the hearings ¶ that have been requested by individuals who have been charged ¶ with violating the regulations. During the 10 years since the ¶ Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the agency has been required to ¶ provide individuals with an administrative law judge hearing ¶ upon request. However, since that time, the Department of ¶ Treasury has not had any judges on staff. As of December 2001, ¶ the backlog of requested hearings was reported to be 357.¶ OFAC's devotion of additional resources through the hiring ¶ of administrative law judges to enforce the Cuban Assets ¶ Control Regulations at a time when it has also been assigned ¶ the serious responsibility for tracing and blocking assets of ¶ terrorists responsible for the attacks of September 11 is ¶ profoundly troubling.

### 2ac Canadian ag addon

#### Plan solves Canadian ag

Sagebien and Spadoni 09 (Julia Sagebien, Associate Professor at the School of Business, Dalhousie University, and a Professor at the University of Puerto Rico, and Paolo Spadoni, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in the Center for Inter-American Policy and Research (CIPR), Tulane University, “OH, CANADA, WILL CUBA STAND ON GUARD FOR THEE? PREPARING FOR THE END OF THE U.S. EMBARGO ON CUBA”, http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/strategy/oh-canada-will-cuba-stand-on-guard-for-thee-preparing-for-the-end-of-the-u-s-embargo-on-cuba#.Ufp5mY21EsA, September 2009, Evan)

Canada’s investment, trade and cultural links with Cuba are substantial. In fact, Canada is the second-largest foreign investor in Cuba (after Venezuela) and the third-ranking country in terms of joint ventures with Cuba. Canada is also Cuba’s fourth-largest merchandise trade partner, behind Venezuela, China, and Spain. And Canada sends more tourists to Cuba each year (about 818,000 in 2008) than any other country. But with the end of the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba seeming more and more likely, Canadian firms may soon find themselves doing business in a much more competitive environment, and forced to modify or change their strategy. Though a full lifting of Washington’s embargo is not imminent, it is very likely that in the next year or two the Obama administration will relax some of the sanctions now in effect. Overall, a partial lifting of the embargo might prove to have more of a positive than negative impact on Canadian business. With the injection of cash from American visitors and relatively little competition from U.S. investors or traders, the time between the end of the travel ban on U.S. citizens and the complete lifting of Washington’s embargo will create a rather unique scenario in Cuba. It will be unique because the growing number of U.S. tourists will create business opportunities for all, except the American firms, thus leaving Canadians especially with numerous opportunities.

#### Canadian ag is key to global food supply – new demand is uniquely necessary

Johnson 13 (Kelsey Johnson, political analyst and grad from Carleton University, “Canadian agriculture cuts have global consequences”, http://www.ipolitics.ca/2013/05/31/canadian-agriculture-cuts-have-global-consequences-dean/, 5-31-2013, //Evan)

Recent government cuts to Agriculture Canada could have a major global impact, particularly if the world population — and its appetite — continues to grow, said the dean of one of Canada’s top agriculture faculties. John Kennelly, dean of the University of Alberta’s Faculty of Agriculture, Life and Environmental Sciences, said the government’s decision to cut back on agricultural research comes at a time of a global food shortage. There is an international demand for more food, especially from major agriculture exporters like Canada, he said. “We’re in a situation where the world population reached 7 billion people in 2012, and the projections are that that population is going to continue to increase over the next few decades and is likely to reach 9 billion. “Clearly the world is going to be hard-pressed to feed that growing population and Canada has an important role to play as a major exporter of food in terms of meeting the global need for food,” Kennelly said, adding that meeting that demand could prove to be difficult if research cuts continue. Nearly a third of the country’s agriculture research is done by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, with the remainder conducted by universities, he said. Kennelly’s comments came after Canada’s poultry research chair, professor Tina Widowski, told the House committee on agriculture Thursday that the country’s research capacity is in jeopardy. Two weeks ago, the department fired nearly 700 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada employees — including, Widowski said, highly respected researchers and scientists. “I can tell you that a couple of the researchers that we’re losing from (Agriculture Canada) are considered to be tops in their fields, are very well published, (and) are very well recognized internationally,” she said, adding the University of Guelph (where she works) is losing an up-and-coming young poultry welfare scientist. That scientist, she said, was hired originally by the University of Guelph and Agriculture Canada to increase the country’s research capacity in the area of poultry welfare, an area where Canadian research was lacking. “We’ve been building a great deal of momentum in this area, and I know that’s going to affect, at least in the poultry welfare areas, our research projects,” she said, adding animal welfare research is essential if producers want to remain competitive. It’s research projects like this that are responsible for keeping the global community fed, Kennelly said. “The reason we have been able to feed 7 billion people is because our productivity of our crops … is so much greater now than it was several decades ago,” he said. “Essentially we have fed the growing productivity primarily to increase productivity and that increased productivity of the land is driven by research.” “Any cutbacks in that area is definitely going to impact things in Canada which in turn is going to impact things globally.”

#### Resource wars go global

Lugar 2k Chairman of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee and Member/Former Chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee (Richard, a US Senator from Indiana, is Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a member and former chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee. “calls for a new green revolution to combat global warming and reduce world instability,” pg online @ http://www.unep.org/OurPlanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html)

In a world confronted by global terrorism, turmoil in the Middle East, burgeoning nuclear threats and other crises, it is easy to lose sight of the long-range challenges. But we do so at our peril. One of the most daunting of them is meeting the world’s need for food and energy in this century. At stake is not only preventing starvation and saving the environment, but also world peace and security. History tells us that states may go to war over access to resources, and that poverty and famine have often bred fanaticism and terrorism. Working to feed the world will minimize factors that contribute to global instability and the proliferation of [WMDs] weapons of mass destruction. With the world population expected to grow from 6 billion people today to 9 billion by mid-century, the demand for affordable food will increase well beyond current international production levels. People in rapidly developing nations will have the means greatly to improve their standard of living and caloric intake. Inevitably, that means eating more meat. This will raise demand for feed grain at the same time that the growing world population will need vastly more basic food to eat. Complicating a solution to this problem is a dynamic that must be better understood in the West: developing countries often use limited arable land to expand cities to house their growing populations. As good land disappears, people destroy timber resources and even rainforests as they try to create more arable land to feed themselves. The long-term environmental consequences could be disastrous for the entire globe. Productivity revolution To meet the expected demand for food over the next 50 years, we in the United States will have to grow roughly three times more food on the land we have. That’s a tall order. My farm in Marion County, Indiana, for example, yields on average 8.3 to 8.6 tonnes of corn per hectare – typical for a farm in central Indiana. To triple our production by 2050, we will have to produce an annual average of 25 tonnes per hectare. Can we possibly boost output that much? Well, it’s been done before. Advances in the use of fertilizer and water, improved machinery and better tilling techniques combined to generate a threefold increase in yields since 1935 – on our farm back then, my dad produced 2.8 to 3 tonnes per hectare. Much US agriculture has seen similar increases. But of course there is no guarantee that we can achieve those results again. Given the urgency of expanding food production to meet world demand, we must invest much more in scientific research and target that money toward projects that promise to have significant national and global impact. For the United States, that will mean a major shift in the way we conduct and fund agricultural science. Fundamental research will generate the innovations that will be necessary to feed the world. The United States can take a leading position in a productivity revolution. And our success at increasing food production may play a decisive humanitarian role in the survival of billions of people and the health of our planet.

### 2ac disease reps k

#### Reps don’t come first – can’t explain empirics and produces un-actionable heuristics

Rodwell 5 (Jonathan Rodwell, Ph.D. from Manchester, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

In this response I wish to argue that the Post-Structural analysis put forward by Richard Jackson is inadequate when trying to understand American Politics and Foreign Policy. The key point is that this is an issue of methodology and theory. I do not wish to argue that language is not important, in the current political scene (or indeed any political era) that would be unrealistic. One cannot help but be convinced that the creation of identity, of defining ones self (or one nation, or societies self) in opposition to an ‘other’ does indeed take place. Masses of written and aural evidence collated by Jackson clearly demonstrates that there is a discursive pattern surrounding post 9/11 U.S. politics and society. [i] Moreover as expressed at the start of this paper it is a political pattern and logic that this language is useful for politicians, especially when able to marginalise other perspectives. Nothing illustrates this clearer than the fact George W. Bush won re-election, for whatever the reasons he did win, it is undeniable that at the very least the war in Iraq, though arguable far from a success, at the absolute minimum did not damage his campaign. Additionally it is surely not stretching credibility to argue Bush performance and rhetoric during the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also strengthened his position. However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical. My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding . The first major problem then is that historiographically discourse analysis is so capacious as to be largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history that explains everything and therefore actually explains nothing. To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but [did not] produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated”[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model.

#### Extinction comes first – no other prior questions

Bostrom 12 – Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/)

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

#### Securitizing the environment is good – builds public awareness – and link turns their scholarship args

Matthew 02 (Richard A, associate professor of international relations and environmental political at the University of California at Irvine, Summer, ECSP Report 8:109-124)

In addition, environmental security's language and findings can benefit conservation and sustainable development."' Much environmental security literature emphasizes the importance of development assistance, sustainable livelihoods, fair and reasonable access to environmental goods, and conservation practices as the vital upstream measures that in the long run will contribute to higher levels of human and state security. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are examples of bodies that have been quick to recognize how the language of environmental security can help them. The scarcity/conflict thesis has alerted these groups to prepare for the possibility of working on environmental rescue projects in regions that are likely to exhibit high levels of related violence and conflict. These groups are also aware that an association with security can expand their acceptance and constituencies in some countries in which the military has political control, For the first time in its history; the contemporary environmental movement can regard military and intelligence agencies as potentialallies in the struggle to contain or reverse humangenerated environmental change. (In many situations, of course, the political history of the military--as well as its environmental record-raise serious concerns about the viability of this cooperation.) Similarly, the language of security has provided a basis for some fruitful discussions between environmental groups and representatives of extractive industries. In many parts of the world, mining and petroleum companies have become embroiled in conflict. These companies have been accused of destroying traditional economies, cultures, and environments; of political corruption; and of using private militaries to advance their interests. They have also been targets of violence, Work is now underway through the environmental security arm of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) to address these issues with the support of multinational corporations. Third, the general conditions outlined in much environmental security research can help organizations such as USAID, the World Bank, and IUCN identify priority cases--areas in which investments are likely to have the greatest ecological and social returns. For all these reasons, IUCN elected to integrate environmental security into its general plan at the Amman Congress in 2001. Many other environmental groups and development agencies are taking this perspective seriously (e.g. Dabelko, Lonergan& Matthew, 1999). However, for the most part these efforts remain preliminary.' Conclusions Efforts to dismiss environment and security research and policy activities on the grounds that they have been unsuccessful are premature and misguided. This negative criticism has all too often been based on an excessively simplified account of the research findings of Homer-Dixon and a few others. Homer-Dixon’s scarcity-conflict thesis has made important and highly visible contributions to the literature, but it is only a small part of a larger and very compelling theory. This broader theory has roots in antiquity and speaks to the pervasive conflicts and security implications of complex nature-society relationships. The theory places incidents of violence in larger structural and historical contexts while also specifying contemporarily significant clusters of variables. From this more generalized and inclusive perspective, violence and conflict are revealed rarely as a society’s endpoint and far more often as parts of complicated adaptation processes. The contemporary research on this classical problematic has helped to revive elements of security discourse and analysis that were marginalized during the Cold War. It has also made valuable contributions to our understanding of the requirements of human security, the diverse impacts of globalization, and the nature of contemporary transnational security threats. Finall,y environmental security research has been valuable in myriad ways to a range of academics, policymakers, and activists, although the full extent of these contributions remains uncertain, rather than look for reasons to abandon this research and policy agenda, now is the time to recognize and to build on the remarkable achievements of the entire environmental security field.

#### Disease securitization good – mobilizes international coalitions to prevent and contain outbreaks

Dr. Christian Enemark, 3-1-2005, Visiting Fellow of the John Curtin School of Medical Research at ANU where he serves as Deputy Director of the National Centre for Biosecurity.'INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY', The Nonproliferation Review, 12(1), 107-125

In pursuing international cooperation, a threshold issue is how to win political acceptance for the idea that some infectious diseases pose a threat to security as well as to health. To securitize infectious diseases is to seek some of the overriding political interest and superior financial resources associated with more traditional (military) concepts of security. Labeling something a security issue lends it a sense of urgency, attracts greater public attention, and implicitly demands resources.1 There is a strong humanitarian imperative to mitigate the huge potential and actual loss of life resulting from infectious disease, but humanitarian motivations alone are not sufficient to address this problem. In appealing to national governments\*/still the principal players in the international arena\*/infectious diseases need to be portrayed in such a way as to stimulate concerns about national interests. Historically, governments have shown greater enthusiasm toward their own security than they have toward humanitarian causes.A good introduction to the way in which infectious diseases impact security is to examine their relevance to military operations throughout history. The historian Livy described an outbreak of plague in the Carthaginian and Roman armies during the siege of Syracuse in 212 BC. The Carthaginians, less accustomed than the Romans to the city’s moist climate, suffered greater casualties from the disease and were defeated shortly afterward.2 In the thirteenth century, the Mongol invasions helped spread various epidemics of plague between East Asia and Eastern Europe. The sixteenth century demise of the Aztec empire came about mostly because the Spanish conquerors brought smallpox and measles with them to the New World. During World War I, an outbreak of typhus in Serbia in 1915 was so severe that the fighting on both sides stopped for six months.And disease was relevant in April 2003 when Canada’s health minister suggested that medical staff from the Canadian Forces could help relieve pressure on Toronto hospital staff treating patients with SARS. The military replied that it was already critically short of physicians to look after its troops. At the time, Canada was preparing for a major deployment to Afghanistan. Had the SARS outbreak in Toronto become so bad as to require medical personnel from Canadian military units to assist, those units would not have been able to deploy overseas.3 In one sense, infectious diseases are already an ‘‘established’’ security threat in the form of biological warfare. Weapons for deliberately disseminating pathogenic micro­organisms potentially pose direct security threats to many countries. BW is not a new threat like emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, and it fits more easily within traditional conceptions of security. For these reasons, attempts to link disease and security via the problem of BW tend to resonate more strongly with the public and policymakers. But biological weapons are just one part of a spectrum of risks associated with the biological sciences. The spectrum encompasses natural disease outbreaks, accidents arising from otherwise benign activities such as medical research with pathogens, and the use of disease as a weapon of war or terror.5

#### Nuclear weapon securitization good – empowers anti-prolif movements

Babst 97, retired government scientist and Coordinator of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation's Accidental Nuclear War Studies program, Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and Aldridge, former aerospace engineer, now leads the Pacific Life Research Center, ’97 (Dean, David, and Bob, November, “The self-destructiveness of nuclear weapons: a dangerous and costly mental block” Canadian Business and Current Affairs, Vol 29 No 97 p 11-19)

There is worldwide reluctance to think about the self-destructive consequence of the use of nuclear weapons. Though understandable, this reluctance is dangerous and costly. It prevents public discourse and political engagement by citizens of the nuclear-weapons states concerning one of the most important issues of our time. The lack of public attention in nuclear-weapons states tothe self-destructiveness of nuclear weapons has allowed humankind to place itself in danger of annihilation, and to spend some $8 trillion over the course of the nuclear age doing so. Denial of the dangers or likelihood of nuclear-weapons use has created a dangerous mental block that must be overcome. We owe it to ourselves and to our posterity to break through this mental block and directly confront the dangers of annihiliaton, including self-annihilation, inherent in reliance on nuclear arsenals. We reasoned that if the citizens in nuclear-weapons states understood that the use of a hundred or so nuclear weapons could turn the world into an unbearable place in which to live, they would take a less complacent view of maintaining nuclear arsenals. We believed that an awareness of the self-destructive consequences of the use of nuclear arsenals would lead to a general understanding that nuclear weapons are a source of insecurity rather than security. This understanding, we reasoned, would lead to a desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. We discovered, however, that virtually nothing was being published on the subject of the self-destructive consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The fact that an issue as important as this one was not even being discussed in the mass media alerted us to the existence of widespread public denial regarding this issue. We also realized that the issue of nuclear arsenals and their use was not even entering into public debate during elections in the nuclear-weapons states. As we looked into this situation further, we found many other indications of public denial of the suicidal dangers of nuclear arsenals. We have listed some of these indications below.

#### Modern democratic structures check their impacts

**Dickinson ‘4** (Edward Ross Dickinson, professor of modern history, University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy”, Central European History, 37(1), 2004, ejournals)

In short, the **continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time** are unmistakable. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis **can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different** strategic and local **dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes**. **Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism**. Above all, again, **it has nowhere developed the** fateful, **radicalizing dynamic** that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic **that leads from economistic population management to mass murder**. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can -- and historically does -- create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, **there are political and policy** potentials and **constraints** in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. **Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of** self-direction and **participation that is functionally incompatible with** authoritarian or **totalitarian structures**. And **this pursuit of biopolitical ends through** a regime of **democratic citizenship** **does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies**, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.(n90) Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of "liberty," just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics**, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not "opposites," in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept "power" should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively "the same." Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, "tactically polyvalent." Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create "multiple modernities," modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.(n91)

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#### Subject of engagement is financial restrictions – these are economic means, even if intended end (increasing migration) is not

Odell 2K (John S. Odell, Professor, School of International Relations, University of Southern California, former editor of International Organization, *Negotiating the World Economy*, Cornell University, 2000, p.11-12, amazon preview)

This book is not about all bargaining, only bargaining that is both international¶ and economic. International means that at least one party is a national govern-¶ ment and at least one other party is based outside that country.¶ Economic negotiations are those in which parties’ demands, offers, and related¶ actions refer to the production, movement or exchange of goods, services, invest-¶ ments (including official development loans), money, information, or their regula-¶ tion. This book concentrates on trade and finance, but economic bargaining in-¶ cludes other issues such as transportation, communication, and investment. All¶ such episodes share a crucial property that is absent from typical security negoti-¶ ations: they are sensitive to concrete markets. This market sensitivity is found in¶ many cases that are otherwise diverse. Economic episodes are important enough¶ and distinctive enough for study and yet they have not been viewed together in¶ this light.¶ Note that economic refers to the issues that parties discuss explicitly with each¶ other, not necessarily to the goals that negotiators might have in mind. Suppose¶ government A offered government B a trade or financial concession, and suppose¶ one unstated objective was to make B heavily dependent on A in wartime. I would¶ call this episode an economic—not a military—negotiation in which a secret se-¶ curity objective was heavily weighted. We already have substantial scholarship on¶ economic sanctions and statecraft driven primarily by security and other noneco-¶ nomic purposes.9 This book instead aims to illuminate the great bulk of economic¶ negotiations—those whose negotiating objectives are economic and domestic-¶ political. Here, where most of the action in economic bargaining probably takes¶ place, received knowledge is much less well developed. Eventually a valid single¶ theory covering both types of economic bargaining would be even more useful.¶ A third set of negotiations mixes economic with military, human rights, or¶ other issues. For example, the Philippines and the United States bargain over mil-¶ itary base rights and foreign aid; Ukraine and Germany negotiate over initial¶ diplomatic recognition and establishment of relations. This book also sets aside¶ such mixed episodes in order to concentrate on those limited to explicit economic¶ issues.10 There are already many studies of bargaining over military-political is-¶ sues." It seems sensible to clarify purely economic negotiations next, before in-¶ vestigating whether mixed cases require additional analysis.